DATE=11/30/2002

TYPE=ON THE LINE

NUMBER=1-01236

TITLE=NATO EXPANSION

INTERNET=Yes

EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY 619-0037

CONTENT=

THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE

Host: A new mission for a new NATO. Next, On the Line.

[music]

Host: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO is expanding. At a summit in Prague, the Czech Republic, seven countries, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to join the alliance, bringing the number of members to twenty-six. NATO is also moving to modernize its military capabilities to confront the threat of global terrorism. And on the subject of Iraq, NATO put its full support behind the new United Nations resolution demanding that Saddam Hussein disarm. "Our alliance is being tested by new and terrible dangers," said President Bush. "The terrorists seek to end life and control all lives and like the Nazis and Communists before them, they will be opposed by free nations and the terrorists will be defeated," he said. How will the new NATO contribute to international security? I'll ask my guests, Robert Hunter, former ambassador to NATO and now a senior advisor at the RAND Corporation; Gary Schmitt, executive director of the project for the New American Century; and Charles Kupchan, director of Europe Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Welcome and thanks for joining us today.

Host: Robert Hunter, how significant was the Prague summit?

Hunter: I think it was significant in two respects: first it does set the agenda for closing the book on the twentieth century -- the most terrible century in human history -- not only taking in seven new members, but ratifying a new relationship with Russia. And in effect ratifying the American presence in Europe for that agenda. But it is also important because in the slow progress of getting NATO allies to look beyond Europe, I think President Bush has made some significant headway. Not only will there be a new reaction force, which will enable NATO to do certain things it didn't do before -- not a very big force, but then, there's not a lot of military action against terrorism that's going to be needed. Also, there was a reinforcement of the U-N resolution against Iraq and the understanding that for the future, Europeans, like Americans, have to look elsewhere if we're all going to be secure.

Host: Gary Schmitt, has this made this transition from Cold War thinking to the war on terrorism?

Schmitt: Well, NATO's made a lot of progress over the past ten years in ways that people I think didn't anticipate, but there's still a ways to go. Even though there are these new capabilities that have been promised, there's no consensus yet about how to use those capabilities. There's no overarching strategic concept which would guide how these capabilities would be used and that is the big problem facing NATO right now.

Host: Charles Kupchan, let's talk a little bit about the new members of NATO. What do they bring to NATO?

Kupchan: Well, unlike in the previous round in the mid-nineties when the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary joined, in this case, the United States and current NATO members did not say you have to reach certain military standards, because these countries can't. They don't have enough economic capability. They don't have enough military capability. So at this point, the language is these will be niche players. One country will bring chemical weapons capabilities. One country will bring intelligence capabilities or special forces. So in that sense, no one is really pretending anymore that this is about building a big defensive military alliance. So, NATO was changing in that respect. And I also think it suggests that little by little NATO is shifting away from being a military organization fighting wars to something that is primarily a political talk shop. And in that sense, I think it's becoming less useful to the United States. Because the U-S is really now focusing on terrorism in other parts of the world. NATO is expanding. That's good that it's getting rid of that Cold War divide, but I think little by little it's also losing its relevance as a military alliance. Robert Hunter, is NATO losing its relevance as a military alliance?

Hunter: Well, Charles Kupchan and I agree on an awful lot, but not on that. In terms of wrapping up the twentieth century, keeping the countries, now nineteen -- soon to be twenty-six -- doing their military business together. There's never been an alliance in history that has enabled the various militaries to do that. That's an asset. Also people really continue to be concerned about the future of Russia. And having the alliance in place and America there to try to nurture Russia to do the right things is historically important. Now, moving elsewhere, we would never expect all of these allies to go and do particular things. Some allies will be with us, against weapons of mass destruction, against terrorism. But one thing even for the ones who don't, NATO remains the greatest repository on earth of military capabilities, of an attitude about the importance of this, plus a lot of resources in other matters -- intelligence, police work, financial capacity -- which we absolutely need. Broader sense of security. But NATO as a military alliance still remains important.

Host: Gary Schmitt, are these new countries important for what they say politically or what they bring militarily to the table?

Schmitt: It's a little bit of both actually. I mean, some of these countries are going to be very, very supportive of the United States because they do still feel a threat from Russia, so they're more likely to side with us in the councils of NATO. Plus, I think the other part of this is that some of these states, for example Romania and Bulgaria, are very well placed strategically, geographically when we're talking about moving and expanding U-S efforts in the Middle East and to the Caucasus. These are very good jumping off places. So they bring to the table not only political will but also some important assets that we don't otherwise have.

Host: The talk of NATO expansion affecting Russia and any sense that Russia may not be stable and democratic in the future, Charles Kupchan. How is Russia responding to this expansion of NATO?

Kupchan: Much less caustically than in the last round. The Russians basically weren't wild about it, but they didn't object vociferously and I think that's for several different reasons. One is that you now have a meaningful NATO-Russia council, what's called "NATO at Twenty," where Russia has a seat at the table. They're not a member, but their voice is heard. They're engaged in the consultations of the alliance as a whole. Secondly, I think Putin has changed Russian strategy towards the West. He wants to build economic and institutional ties to Europe, and in that sense, doesn't want NATO expansion to be a deal-breaker. So the U-S-Russia relationship has changed after September 11th, especially because the Russians in some ways welcomed America into Central Asia. The United States needed bases there to prosecute the war in Afghanistan. So quietly, I think there's been a revolution in Russian-U-S relations. And that means that they basically said, "We're not going to object to this," even though the Baltics were getting into this round. And I think, hopefully in this next wave, we'll see NATO expand not just to the Balkan states, which are still outside, but perhaps by 2010 or 2015 we could envisage Russia itself becoming a member of NATO.

Host: Robert Hunter, Russia as a new member of NATO?

Hunter: I agree with everything Charlie said up until that point. [laughter] Transformation of the relationship he's got exactly right, but Russia as a member of NATO, that presumes a change in global politics so dramatic. Think about the United States giving a commitment, with our allies, to Russia to defend its border against China, which is what NATO membership implies. The central element of NATO still is each country is prepared to defend all the others against all comers. That's why the day after we were attacked on nine-eleven, the NATO allies for the first time invoked that clause to say they would even go to war with us [on our side] even though it was a different part of the world. Bring in Russia and you've got a different NATO. The world will have changed. I don't think it will change that much. I think we're going to have continued competition with Russia in different parts of the world, however it goes in Europe. Try to work on it differently but they are a long way, Russia, from becoming a power that is going to see the world eye-to-eye with us, and they may never.

Schmitt: Yes. If I could interject, I think we're right to see a real change in Russian foreign policy under Putin. The reality is, however, that the military, national security establishment, the foreign ministry still haven't bought into that change in Putin's own policy. So there's a real tension in Moscow right now between what Putin wants to accomplish and in fact people who still don't think of the West as the place they want to be.

Host: Gary Schmitt, let's move to another part of this discussion, which is as NATO expands, previously nineteen members of NATO and a consensus policy for military action involving NATO that has at times complicated the ability of NATO to act. Is that further complicated by the expansion of membership?

Schmitt: Well, in the short term, it actually helps because a lot of these new states are going to be friendly to the U-S. So, I think in the short term, the answer is it doesn't complicate it. It actually will be better for the United States and the councils of NATO. But the truth is, over the long term: yes this is going to be a problem. It's hard to get unanimity about doing anything, let alone having twenty-six nations agree about doing something. So, I think we're going to have to learn to live with a NATO in which it's sort of a kind of community of democratic states, that among that community people are going to decide to help the U-S on occasion in different ways. And we'll have to learn to live with the fact that it won't be flying a NATO flag, but that NATO itself will be a repository of alliance friendships and capabilities that we'll draw on as we need. Again it's not your father's NATO.

Host: Charles Kupchan, how do you think that this larger NATO is going to function in practice?

Kupchan: I'm actually much less optimistic than my two colleagues here about NATO's future in the sense that I think the fundamental structural changes that Bob says he doesn't see coming are already happening. And that is that Europe is in peace, it's wealthy. America's business in Europe is to some extent over. It's been successful. I think the U-S is going to shift its strategic priorities to the Middle East and to northeast Asia, and NATO and Europe will become more of a side-show than a centerpiece. And I also think we're seeing that even though the new members of central Europe are very pro-American and very pro-Atlanticist, the old members are not. There is an increasing political rift between traditional West European countries and the United States, in part because I think the E-U is simply coming of age, becoming more collective, more capable and they're saying: "Hey, America, make room for us. "Partly because of the ill-will that's developing between the Bush administration and the Europeans thinking that the Bush administration is too unilateralist, with the Americans thinking that the Europeans are more of a nuisance than a partner because they don't have enough military capability. So I think beneath the surface we are seeing the beginning of a parting of ways between Europe and the United States that does not bode well for NATO.

Host: Robert Hunter, is there a parting of ways between Europe and the United States?

Hunter: No. What's happening, I think the pendulum has swung already. I think the Bush administration in order to put a coalition together against Iraq said some pretty strong things and ruffled some feathers. It's sometimes hard for foreigners to understand the figure of American debate shown on television. But there is this resolution at the United Nations that's pretty strong. There is the ratification at NATO of that. It is true this is an alliance that will deal primarily with Europe and some other things. It's not a world-wide alliance. These are sovereign countries. But it still remains those countries we're going to want to have around when we're doing other things, whether it's in Iraq, in Afghanistan -- six NATO allies are fighting -- sixteen countries happen to be there. Now, getting a consensus at NATO is never easy, it requires leadership. But I'll tell you, when NATO has come up with a consensus, nobody has ever stood against it. NATO has never failed to do what it said it would do. Sometimes it may be called upon to do that. Sometimes it might not be. The United States may want to do coalitions of the willing and able like we did ten years ago in the Persian Gulf. There's nothing wrong with that. Use NATO when it's effective. Don't use it when you want to do other things.

Host: Gary Schmitt, Charles Kupchan raises this issue of unilateralism versus multilateralism. How is that issue joined in this summit in Prague?

Schmitt: Well, actually I think one of the untold stories here is the degree to which the administration is actually beginning to realize that they need NATO. They've put out a very bold National Security Strategy which requires a lot of the U-S. It may well be that it requires more than the U-S has. The truth is we need our allies, partners, to help carry out that policy. I mean, we can do certain things militarily that they can't do, but it's when the shooting stops that I think we're going to need our allies most. And I think the administration is coming to terms with the fact that there are only so many bodies in the U-S that are capable of pulling off all the things that we're committed to and we do need more bodies, more troops, more willing and able coalition partners, and NATO's going to be part of that process.

Hunter: One reason I think the pendulum has swung back is exactly this point. The president seems to have come to an understanding in recent months. He's got to have allies. Maybe not just for Iraq, but to [join] in the war on terrorism. Don Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, says the largest coalition in human history, ninety countries in one way or another. After, whether there's shooting or not, shooting in Iraq, sorting out the Middle East in terms of money, in terms of man-power, in terms of political leadership, in terms of cash, the whole thing. The United States is going to need these allies and the president clearly understands that.

Host: You've raised the issue of the war on terrorism. What role is NATO going to have in this reinvigorated way of turning its efforts into the war on terrorism?

Hunter: Maybe not NATO so much, other than being a kind of clearing house for a lot of things and providing some military capacity when it's required. But these are the same countries we look to for intelligence, for controlling the flow of finances -- because these are the great financial powers -- for police work, for digging out the cells in much of the world. So, whether they're called NATO or European Union or bilateral the same people we're looking to for help and they are helping.

Host: Charles Kupchan, is that going to be the main role of NATO partners in fighting the war on terrorism? Is this sort of police activity?

Kupchan: I think what the Bush administration tried to do at the Prague summit was to get NATO to approve the global strike force, which NATO allies approved. But it's a small force. It's roughly twenty-thousand. We're talking about if the U-S goes into Iraq, two-hundred-and-fifty to up to maybe five-thousand troops. So this is a drop in the bucket. And also beneath the surface, I think the distance between the United States and almost all European countries save the British is quite large: whether we should attack Saddam Hussein, whether we should invade and occupy the country. And so, even though I think there is a sense among NATO as a whole that we need to worry about terrorism, I'm less convinced than Bob that we're all on the same sheet of music here. And I think that as the next few months unravel and weapons inspections move ahead, we'll see more daylight on this issue. And my guess is when the U-S, should it go to war in Iraq, when it goes, it will have only a handful of European countries by its side. It will be a coalition of the willing and NATO as such will not play a very prominent role.

Host: Gary Schmitt?

Schmitt: Yes. If I could just sort of split the difference. I in fact think there are some very deep differences about the U-S role in the world. The U-S theory about the war on terrorism; the U-S policy towards Iraq. However, I think that can be overstated. I mean, the truth is, when we do go to war with Iraq, if we do go to war with Iraq, we're going to find that we have plenty of countries from NATO on our side: Norway, Spain, Italy, France even. The exception, the odd exception, the big exception is going to be Germany. But I think you're going to find in fact a lot more support from NATO countries than people anticipate now.

Host: Robert Hunter, will the support against Iraq be just some NATO countries as opposed to NATO per se?

Hunter: Well, there were some NATO countries against Iraq ten years ago. The United States is not going to ask the NATO machinery to do this. We're going to lead the coalition, but as Gary's saying, if there is a U-N resolution to go to war, then I think we're going to get most of the NATO allies in one way or another -- certainly the French, they made that clear. One thing I discovered at NATO is after all the shouting from Paris stops, they love a fight. They don't want to be left out. They're among our staunchest allies. I wouldn't even be surprised if we have to go to war, Saddam Hussein forces a war and there's a U-N resolution, I wouldn't even rule out some support from the Germans militarily at that point.

Host: What sort of support?

Hunter: Well, we wouldn't be looking for much. What Charlie's talking about is niche capabilities. Germany, for example, has a unit in Kuwait today which is extraordinarily good at detecting biological and chemical weapons. They're sitting in Kuwait. Now, stepping across the border wouldn't take very much physically. Politically, under the right circumstances, I think they'd do it too.

Host: Gary Schmitt, one of the issues that was addressed at the summit in Prague was the big gap between the military capability of the United States and the NATO countries that had built their military to face down the Soviet Union. How is that dealt with and how are those capabilities going to be improved?

Schmitt: Well, it's a little bit smoke and mirrors, frankly. They've made commitments to try and improve these capabilities in certain key areas: Lift [transport by air] precision-guided weaponry and the like. But, there's still a lot to be done. A lot of these commitments are paper commitments. The defense budgets have to be increased and they have to spend their money much more wisely. Germany, for example, right now is trying to take over the leadership of the forces that are in Afghanistan. They have a thousand troops there now. They want to add eight hundred to fill out the ranks. They can't find eight-hundred new soldiers that are capable of existing in Afghanistan's tough conditions. So, there's a huge gap in how the German forces are prepared and that's sort of typical of a lot of the NATO states.

Host: Charles Kupchan, was the experience in Afghanistan, both the war in Afghanistan and now the experience of peacekeepers, has that exacerbated this issue of military capabilities in NATO?

Kupchan: Well, I do think you have such a huge gap between American technology and capability and European technology and capability that it's hard to get the two forces to work together. We saw, for example, in Kosovo that American pilots couldn't even talk to their European counterparts because the radios were so different. So I fear that we're seeing a bit of a division of labor, with the United States doing the war-fighting and the Europeans doing the cleaning up and the nation-building. Is that sustainable over the long run? I'm not sure. So I think what we ought to aim for is the E-U, as my colleagues have said, has to put more money and more effort into defense capability. They're not going to be going off into the horizon with the United States for decades to come. They're just not going to spend that kind of money. But I think what we will see is the E-U sort of emerging as an entity that can take care of Europe, fight small wars in Europe. That frees up the United States to do Iraq, go to other places in the world. But that's partly why I'm not so confident that this Atlantic partnership, as we've known it, is going to last, because I do see this functional and geographic split emerging.

Host: We have a little bit less than a minute, but Robert Hunter, maybe you can talk a little bit about the relationship between NATO and the European Union as this goes forward.

Hunter: Well, the European Union is not going to do any, what we call "heavy lifting" militarily for a long time to come. But they are creating this rapid reaction force. NATO's creating a reaction force, kind of a test-bed to try to get some of the Europeans up to speed. It will help if we share our high technology. Now guess what. The people who will actually be in the European Union force and the people in the NATO force, they're going to be the same people. And that is good news, I think, for both the E-U and NATO. But it is true, I think we agree, a number of the European Countries are going to have to do a lot more in terms of high technology military, or we will see some fundamental splits in NATO that we won't be able to heal.

Host: I'm afraid that's going to have to be the last word for today. I'd like to thank my guests, Robert Hunter, former ambassador to NATO; Gary Schmitt of the Project for the New American Century, and Charles Kupchan of the Council on Foreign Relations. Before we go, I'd like to invite our audience to send us your questions or comments. You can e-mail them to Ontheline@ibb.gov For On the Line, I'm Eric Felten.